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Can't really figure out how this is possible, even applications that you install shouldn't be allowed to send chat messages on your behalf. Perhaps browser malware?
I've moved! http://pleasefeedthegeek.wordpress.com/
If I have a joint of meat on my table of which the smell and the taste at once convince me that it is putrid and unwholesome, should I show discretion by eating the whole of it before giving my judgment that it is not fit for food? One mouthful is quite enough, and one sentence of some books ought to suffice for a sensible man to reject the whole mass. Let those who can relish such meat feed on it, but I have a taste for better food.
S60 3rd Edition SDK for Symbian OS, Feature Pack 2 > Tools and Utilities > Using the SDK with an IDE > Java Development > NetBeans > Installing and configuring NetBeans
The lesson to take from this hypothetical example is that counting vulnerability reports is as likely to lead you to the wrong conclusion as to the right conclusion. Find more information before making a decision. Think through the implications of any metric you have available.
Don’t buy the easy interpretation just because it’s easy.
An interesting cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability found in the Google Spreadsheets service would have allowed attackers to gain unauthorised access to other Google services, including Gmail and Google Docs.
The vulnerability was discovered by security engineer Billy Rios, and takes advantage of nuances in the way Internet Explorer handles Content-Types for webpages.
When a spreadsheet is saved and downloaded in CSV format, the Content-Type is set to "text/plain", thereby instructing the client's browser that the document should be treated as plain text. However, if HTML tags are entered into the first cell of the spreadsheet, Internet Explorer detects these tags near the start of the CSV document and instead deduces that it should be treated as HTML. This essentially allowed arbitrary HTML webpages to be served from spreadsheets.google.com, which in turn allowed JavaScript to be executed in the context of the spreadsheets.google.com site. A remote attacker could exploit this weakness by stealing the user's session cookies and hijacking their session.
Rios points out that Google cookies are valid for all google.com sub domains. This means that when a user logs in to Gmail, the Gmail cookie is also valid for other Google services, such as Google Code, Google Docs, Google Spreadsheets, and more. Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in any of these sub domains can allow an attacker to hijack a user's session and access other Google services as if they were that user.
Google has fixed the vulnerability discovered by Rios and there have been no reports of the vulnerability being exploited by attackers.